Florida Appellate Courts Clarify Key Principles in Administrative Law and Agency Oversight

The Winter 2025 edition of the Florida Bar Administrative Law Section’s newsletter includes several important appellate decisions that shed light on a variety of recurring legal issues in administrative law, including vacancy appointments, preemption, rulemaking authority, and exhaustion of administrative remedies. Together, these cases reflect ongoing judicial efforts to balance agency discretion, legislative preemption, and individual access to judicial review.

Below is a detailed summary of these decisions and their significance.

Vacancy Timing Under Florida’s Resign-to-Run Law

Golden v. Satcher, 395 So. 3d 207 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024)

In Golden v. Satcher, the Second District addressed a procedural wrinkle in Florida’s resign-to-run law. Richard Tatem, a sitting school board member, resigned in advance of his candidacy for the state legislature, stating his resignation would be effective on November 5, 2024—the day he would assume legislative office if elected.

Golden, seeking to qualify for the soon-to-be-vacant seat, was denied by the Supervisor of Elections, who maintained that the seat would not appear on the 2024 ballot. Golden filed a mandamus action, which the circuit court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Second District affirmed.

The appellate court held that under § 99.012(3)(f), Fla. Stat., a vacancy due to resignation is not deemed to occur until the effective date of the resignation—November 5, 2024 in this case. Therefore, the calculation of “the remainder of the term” under Article IV, Section 1(f) of the Florida Constitution begins on the effective date. Since less than 28 months remained in the term at that time, gubernatorial appointment, not election, was appropriate.

The decision is a clear endorsement of the Legislature’s interpretive authority in cases where the Constitution is silent. The court declined to follow an older advisory opinion to the Governor that supported an earlier date for vacancy calculation, noting intervening statutory amendments.

Key takeaway: Courts will adhere to the statutory language of Florida’s resign-to-run law in determining the timing of a vacancy, even if constitutional ambiguity might allow for alternative interpretations.

No Administrative Exhaustion Required in Firearm Regulation Preemption Cases

Pretzer v. Swearingen, 394 So. 3d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024)

Pretzer challenged the Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s (FDLE) firearm background check policies, alleging a violation of the firearm preemption statute, § 790.33(3)(f), Fla. Stat. The trial court dismissed the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The First DCA reversed, finding that the plain language of the 2011 amendments to § 790.33 expressly provides a private cause of action and does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing suit. The appellate court emphasized that the Legislature’s intent was to create a judicial remedy that could not be circumvented by an agency’s invocation of administrative processes.

The court also found the statutory preemption broadly prohibits local and state agencies from regulating firearms without express legislative authorization. Therefore, an agency’s internal policy regulating firearm purchases could be subject to suit even in the absence of a formally adopted rule.

Key takeaway: The firearm preemption statute, as amended in 2011, creates an independent cause of action that plaintiffs can pursue in court without first challenging the rule under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

Enforcement of Preemption Clarified in Similar Case

Caranna v. Glass, 392 So. 3d 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024)

In Caranna, the First DCA extended its reasoning in Pretzer to another lawsuit challenging FDLE’s policies regarding supplemental criminal history checks for concealed carry license holders. The trial court had dismissed the case based on a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The First DCA reversed again, reinforcing that plaintiffs suing under § 790.33(3)(f) are not required to pursue administrative rule challenges prior to filing suit. The court reiterated that the preemption statute expressly allows for direct judicial relief and includes language making clear that post-suit corrective actions by agencies do not moot claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Key takeaway: Even where a regulatory agency modifies its position after suit is filed, plaintiffs maintain their right to pursue relief under § 790.33, and courts will not require exhaustion of administrative remedies beforehand.

Post-Suit Correction Doesn’t Moot Preemption Claim

Heffron v. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 391 So. 3d 667 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024)

Heffron’s case added an additional layer to the evolving jurisprudence under § 790.33. After initially being denied a concealed firearms license by FDLE and FDACS, Heffron later reapplied and received her license. Despite this, she pursued litigation alleging that the denial and underlying regulations violated Florida’s firearm preemption law.

The trial court dismissed the claim on three grounds: (1) failure to exhaust administrative remedies, (2) mootness due to the eventual issuance of the license, and (3) misjoinder of FDLE as a party.

The First DCA reversed on all counts. The court emphasized again that exhaustion is not required, and that the later correction of an alleged violation does not defeat a claim under § 790.33(3)(f). Moreover, the court found the allegations regarding an interagency agreement between FDACS and FDLE sufficient to maintain FDLE as a defendant.

Key takeaway: Judicial review of firearm regulation preemption claims remains viable even when agencies issue licenses or otherwise cure alleged violations post-suit. The right to declaratory and injunctive relief survives.

Clarifying the Jurisdictional Impact of Administrative Exhaustion

Higgins v. Citrus Hill Prop. Owners Ass’n, 392 So. 3d 602 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024)

In Higgins, the trial court dismissed a homeowner’s claim regarding the Department of Economic Opportunity’s approval of a revitalized declaration of covenants, citing a failure to exhaust administrative remedies and asserting that DEO had exclusive jurisdiction.

The Fifth DCA affirmed per curiam but included a concurring opinion by Judge Kilbane addressing the distinction between jurisdiction and exhaustion. Kilbane emphasized that exhaustion is a prudential doctrine—not jurisdictional—and must be raised and proven as an affirmative defense.

This opinion offers a helpful reminder that while courts may dismiss actions for failure to exhaust, such dismissals should not be grounded in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction unless jurisdiction is expressly withdrawn by statute.

Key takeaway: The exhaustion doctrine is a matter of judicial prudence, not a jurisdictional bar. Courts retain subject matter jurisdiction even if a litigant fails to pursue available administrative remedies.

Due Process and Notice in Informal Hearings

Aristilde v. Dep’t of Health, Bd. of Nursing, 391 So. 3d 964 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024)

In Aristilde, the Department of Health revoked a nursing license after the licensee failed to appear for an informal hearing. Aristilde argued that he never received notice of the hearing. Although notice was mailed to the proper address, Aristilde submitted an affidavit denying receipt.

The Fourth DCA reversed, finding that a factual dispute over receipt of the hearing notice required an evidentiary hearing. The court cited precedent establishing that the presumption of receipt arising from proper mailing is rebuttable.

Key takeaway: When a licensee denies receiving notice of an administrative hearing, agencies must provide an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue before entering a final order.

License Revocation Based on Alford Plea

Sanchez-Del Valle v. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 393 So. 3d 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024)

This case involved the revocation of a security officer’s license following a plea to felony and misdemeanor charges. The Department revoked the license under § 493.6118(2)(e), Fla. Stat., which permits revocation based on a plea to disqualifying offenses.

The Third DCA affirmed, holding that the agency had appropriately considered the circumstances of the plea and found sufficient cause to revoke the license.

Key takeaway: A plea of guilty or no contest—even with adjudication withheld—can support revocation of professional licenses under Florida law if statutory standards are met.

Unpromulgated Rule Found in Gaming Commission’s Tax Policy

Fla. Gaming Control Comm’n v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 395 So. 3d 619 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024)

Finally, in a case with implications for all agencies enforcing statutory taxes, the First DCA affirmed an ALJ’s ruling that the Florida Gaming Control Commission’s restrictive interpretation of a tax statute constituted an unadopted rule. The court found that the Commission’s interpretation added requirements not supported by the plain language of the statute and was thus invalid without formal rulemaking.

Key takeaway: Agencies must adhere to statutory language and cannot impose new conditions through interpretation alone. Doing so may result in a successful challenge under Florida’s APA for creating an unpromulgated rule.

Conclusion

These appellate cases underscore the continued importance of statutory interpretation, due process in administrative proceedings, and the careful delineation of agency authority under Florida law. Courts continue to clarify the boundaries of preemption, rulemaking, and exhaustion while affirming the procedural rights of individuals navigating administrative disputes.

For practitioners, these decisions offer valuable insight into current judicial thinking and reinforce the need for precision when evaluating the legal sufficiency of agency actions, statutory claims, and litigation strategies.

© 2025 Jeanette Moffa. All Rights Reserved.